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rbitration offers attractive alternatives to litigation in terms of speed, 
lower costs, flexibility of process and business-oriented decisions. 
However, these advantages can come at the price of a legally incor-
rect decision - a result that is significantly at odds with the judicial process. Over 
the last decade, state and federal courts have struggled to find an acceptable bal-
ance between these competing interests of arbitration and litigation, and their 
efforts have raised an im_portant question: To what extent should courts respect the 
decisions of arbitrators? 
Generally, courts may only set aside arbitration awards on the grounds listed in 
the Federal Arbitration Act1 or the applicable state arbitration code. However, all 
federal circuit courts2 and a few state courts3 have adopted a non-statutory excep-
tion that allows a court to overturn an arbitrator's decision if the arbitrator has 
exemplified a "manifest disregard" of the law.4 
The manifest disregard standard for vacating arbitration awards originated from 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swnn,5 and one court has since 
defined it as an arbitrator's "willful inattentiveness to the governing law."6 
However, in the fifty years following Wilko, only two federal courts have vacated 
an arbih·ation award based on the manifest disregard standard? This may be attrib-
uted to proble1ns associated with distinguishing "manifest disregard" from "ordi-
nary legal error."8 The Willw Court was the first to make this distinction, but it did 
not give explicit guidelines for when or how lower courts should do the same. As a 
result, most courts have taken different approaches to, and have reached different 
results after, implementing the manifest disregard standard.9 
In 2002, after several years of tentative lower court decisions, the Georgia 
Supreme Court, in Progressive Dntn Systems v. Jefferson Holding Corporation, held 
that manifest disregard is not a proper ground for vacatur in Georgia.10 The court 
emphasized that Georgia's Arbitration Code does not iinplicitly contain the mani-
fest disregard standard, and that Georgia courts should not liberally interpret the 
Code in a vain attem_pt to find it.11 In 2003, however, the Georgia General 
Assembly amended the Georgia Arbitration Code to specifically include manifest 
disregard as a ground for vacating arbitration awards.12 Governor Sonny Perdue 
signed the act in June of 2003, effectively nullifying the Georgia Supreme Court's 
decision in Progressive Dntn Systems, and thereby making Georgia the first state in 
the country to statutorily adopt the manifest disregard standard.13 Nevertheless, 
because the new act does not instruct courts regarding how to apply manifest dis-
regard, it is uncertain whether Georgia courts will adopt a broad or narrow inter-
pretation of the doctrine. 
THE INE 
As the time and expenses involved in litigating a case have risen in recent years, 
public policy has dictated an increasing emphasis on more efficient alternatives, 
including arbitration. Arbitration agreements commit parties to accept the deci-
sions of a neutral arbitrator on questions of fact, contract, and law that may arise 
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during the course of a business 
relationship.14 Win or lose, an arbi-
tration agreement is an enforceable 
contractual commitment specifical-
ly entered into, among other rea-
sons, to avoid the more expensive 
option of litigation.15 
In the interest of speed and eco-
nomic efficiency, courts have his-
torically given broad deference to 
arbitrators' decisions. Arbitrators 
are not required to provide a 
record of their rationale,16 and 
courts may not review an arbitra-
tor's award solely on its merits,17 
This arbitral discretion is not 
entirely unfettered, however; arbi-
trators are still bound to follow the 
law.18 Accordingly, judicial review 
of arbitration awards must be 
stringent enough to enforce arbi-
trators' compliance with the appli-
cable laws, while respecting the 
strong federal policy in favor of 
deference to arbitration.19 
Courts that allow application of 
the manifest disregard standard 
generally follow a two-part test in 
determining whether to vacate an 
award under this standard. First, a 
court must look to whether the arbi-
trator knew the applicable law and 
refused to apply it. Second, the court 
attempts to determine whether the 
law was explicit and clearly applica-
ble to the case.20 Thus, this standard 
requires more than a mere error or 
misunderstanding of the law. 
Instead, the arbih·ator must have 
made a conscious decision to ignore 
known and. applicable legal princi-
ples. 21 As one court explained, 
"'[A]s long as the arbitrator is even 
arguably construing or applying the 
contract and acting within the scope 
of his authority,' a court's conviction 
that the arbitrator made a serious 
mistake or conunitted grievous 
error will not fumish a satisfactory 
basis for undoing the decision."22 
12 
Further, determining whether an 
arbitrator rnanifestly disregarded 
the law can be a very difficult task 
because arbitrators do not have to 
disclose the reasons behind their 
awards. When an arbitrator fails to 
explain an award, a reviewing 
court can only infer from the record 
whether the arbitrator knew about 
the governing legal principle but 
decided to ignore it.23 In such a 
case, the court must confirm the 
arbitration award even if the 
ground for the decision is based on 
error of fact or law.24 
As one can see, courts that allow 
for the vacatur of an award based 
on an arbitrator's manifest disre-
gard of the law have set an extreme-
ly high standard for review. 
Because of the strong public policy 
that exists in favor of arbitration, 
courts give great deference to arbi-
trators' decisions, and the judicial 
inquiry 1mder the manifest disre-
gard standard is quite limited.25 
RATIONALE 
FOR APPLYING, 
OR REFUSING 
TO APPLYu 
THE MANIFEST 
DISREGARD 
STANDARD 
Courts evaluating whether to 
adopt the manifest disregard stan-
dard often reach different out-
comes because of conflicting 
philosophies regarding two pri-
mary issues. First, courts disagree 
over the amount of deference they 
shoul_d grant to arbitrators' deci-
sions. 26 Giving greater deference to 
the arbitrator will result in a more 
efficient judicial system. However, 
subjecting the arbitrators' decisions 
to higher scrutiny will encourage 
arbitrators to comply with the 
requirements of the law. 
Second, courts hold differing 
opinions on their ability to vacate 
arbih·ation awards on grounds that 
are not specifically listed in the 
applicable arbitration acts. Some 
state courts have refused to adopt 
the manifest disregard standard 
because it is not mentioned in their 
respective state laws on arbitra-
tion.27 All of the federal circuits, 
however, have adopted the stan-
dard as a ground for vacating arbi-
tration awards,28 either accepting 
that rnanifest disregard is an offi-
cial creation of the judiciary,29 or 
finding that manifest disregard is 
implicit in the language of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.30 
THE 11TH 
CIRCUIT'S 
APPLICATION Of 
THE MANIFEST 
DISREGARD 
STANDARD 
The 11th Circuit adopted two 
other non-statutory grounds for 
vacating arbitration awards before it 
accepted manifest disregard, and it 
only accepted manifest disregard 
when faced with a case where one 
party "explicitly urged [the arbitra-
tor] to disregard the law."31 In 
Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, 
the court vacated an arbitration 
award because Shearson' s attorney 
convinced the arbitrator to rule in 
favor of his client by saying: "I 
know, as I have served many times 
as an arbitrator, that you as an arbi-
trator are not .. . strictly bound by 
case law and precedent. You have 
the ability to do what is right, what 
is fair and proper, and that's what 
Shearson is asking you to do."32 The 
Georgia Bar Journal 
For nearly 10 years, the Georgia Supreme 
Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals have 
reached differing opinions regarding the appli-
cability of the manifest disregard standard. 
11th Circuit analyzed the appropri-
ateness of overturning an arbih·ation 
award under such circumstances 
and "conclude[d] that a manifest 
disregard for the law ... can consti-
tute grounds to vacate an arbih·ation 
decision."33 Nevertheless, the 11th 
Circuit emphasized the narrow 
scope of the rnanifest disregard stan-
dard and noted that it would not 
reverse arbitrators' decisions for 
mere errors or misinterpretations of 
applicable legal principles.34 The 
court only applied the standard in 
Montes because "the arbitrators rec-
ognized that they were told to disre-
gard the law."35 
The most interesting aspect of 
Montes, however, is that in order to 
find that the arbitrators manifestly 
disregarded the law, the 11th 
Circuit had to presume that the 
arbitrators actually followed the 
advice of Shearson's counsel.36 
Thus, the court found JI manifest 
disregard" without any type of 
admission by the arbitrators that 
they consciously ignored the law.37 
Once the court determined that the 
arbitration decision was legally 
incorrect, the statements of 
Shearson' s counsel created a pre-
sumption that the arbitrators 
knowingly disregarded applicable 
legal principles. Because there was 
no evidence in the record to refute 
this presumption, the court vacated 
the arbitration award.38 
A potential problem with the 
11th Circuit's presumption is that, 
if consh·ued broadly, it could be 
abused by the courts. 39 Under such 
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a standard, courts could find that 
virtually any improper evidence 
creates a presumption of arbitral 
wrongdoing. If there is no evidence 
in the record to refute the presump-
tion once it arises (which will usual-
ly be the case because arbitrators 
normally do not provide written 
opinions), the court could freely 
vacate the award. However, the 
Montes court em.phasized that man-
ifest disregard is a narrow ground 
for vacatur and only adopted the 
standard where the record showed 
evidence that one party explicitly 
urged the arbitrator to ignore the 
law.40 Therefore, because such fac-
tual circumstances are rare, the like-
lihood of abuse in the 11th Circuit 
(i.e., applying Montes without legit-
imate evidence of arbitral wrong-
doing) should be minimal.41 
GEORGIA'S 
TREATMENT Of 
THE MANIFEST 
DISREGARD 
STANDARD 
For nearly 10 years, the Georgia 
Supren1e Court and the Georgia 
Court of Appeals have reached dif-
fering opinions regarding the 
applicability of the manifest disre-
gard standard. In 1994, the Georgia 
Court of Appeals accepted the 
principle that JI an arbitrator's deci-
sion must be upheld unless it is 
completely irrational or it consti-
tutes a manifest disregard of the 
law."42 Two years later, however, 
the Georgia Supreme Court stated 
that courts should strictly construe 
the Georgia Arbitration Code43 
and that the four statutory 
grounds listed under Section 9-9-
13(b) of the Code were the exclu-
sive grounds for vacating an arbi-
h·ation award.44 Accordingly, the 
Court aimounced that a court may 
only vacate an arbitration award if 
the rights of a party were preju-
diced by: (1) corruption, fraud, or 
misconduct, (2) a partial arbitrator, 
(3) an arbitrator's overstepping his 
authority, or (4) a court's failure to 
follow procedure.45 
In 2002, the Georgia Supre1ne 
Court issued another opinion on 
the validity of n1.anifest disregard 
as a ground for vacatur. Progressive 
Dntn Systems v. Jefferson Randolph 
Corp. involved an arbitrator's deci-
sion to award future licensing fees 
as damages for a breach of contract. 
Even though the arbitrator recog-
nized that future licensing fees 
were an unenforceable penalty, he 
awarded them anyway.46 The 
Georgia Court of Appeals vacated 
the award by saying that the arbi-
trator manifestly disregarded the 
law, and it held that Section 9-9-
13(b)(3) of the Georgia Arbitration 
Code implicitly contained manifest 
disregard as a ground for 
vacatur.47 However, the Georgia 
Supreme Court reversed the Court 
of Appeals' decision, emphasizing 
that manifest disregard is not 
implicit within Section 9-9-13(6)(3), 
which section only allows courts to 
overturn arbitration awards when 
arbitrators overstep their authori-
ty .48 The Georgia Supreme Court 
noted that " [ o ]verstepping the 
arbitrator's authority ... only cmnes 
into play when an arbitrator deter-
mines matters beyond the scope of 
the case," and does not include the 
concept of manifest disregard.49 
Georgia Bar Journal 
Despite the Georgia Supreme 
Court's efforts to exclude manifest 
disregard as a ground for vacating 
arbitrntion awards, the standard 
now exists in the state because of 
recent actions taken by the 
Georgia General Assembly. In 
January 2003, a bill was intro-
duced in the Georgia House of 
Representatives to specifically 
include manifest disregard as one 
of the grounds for vacatur con-
tained in Section 9-9-13(b). 
Although that bill later died in the 
Senate,50 a second version success-
fully passed through both houses 
in April 2003. The governor then 
signed the bill into law on June 4, 
2003,51 making Georgia the first 
state to legislatively adopt the 
manifest disregard standard. 
Therefore, effective July 1, 2003, 
"manifest disregard" is a valid 
ground for vacating arbitration 
awards in Georgia. 
Because the General Assembly 
has enacted manifest disregard as 
part of Georgia's Arbitration 
Code, Georgia courts must now 
decide how to apply the standard 
to the vacatur of arbitration 
awards. The language of the 
amendment to the Georgia 
Arbitration Code does not give 
courts any instruction on how to 
do so. The Code simply states 
that courts should overturn arbi-
tration awards if the rights of a 
party were prejudiced by "[t]he 
arbitrator's manifest disregard of 
the law."52 Therefore, Georgia 
courts are free to interpret the 
breadth of the new manifest dis-
regard standard. 
WHAT 
Considering the issues raised in 
state and federal courts over how 
to apply manifest disregard as a 
ground for vacatur, no clear 
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guidelines exist for how Georgia 
courts should treat the General 
Assembly's recent arnendment to 
the Arbitration Code. One might 
argue that if the General 
Assembly had wanted to con-
strain arbitrators to be strictly 
bound by applicable law, the 
amendment could have been 
much more intentional. For exam-
ple, the General Assembly could 
have enacted a specific ground for 
vacatur that the arbitrators "failed 
or refused to follow applicable 
law." Instead, the legislature 
incorporated into the General 
Arbitration Code a checkered 
judicial doctrine most often inter-
preted by other state and federal 
courts to have a limited reach.53 
Indeed, previous 11th Circuit and 
Georgia Court of Appeals deci-
sions dealing with the issue of 
manifest disregard have attempt-
ed to place severe limitations on a 
court's authority to review the 
merits of an arbitrator's decision, 
and these limitations may well be 
instructive as to how Georgia 
courts will treat the standard. 
If Georgia courts continue with 
this trend and treat the manifest 
disregard standard as they have in 
the past, the scope of the manifest 
disregard doctrine in Georgia will 
be very limited. 
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Waynesboro Jerry Daniel 
48. Progressive Data Systems, 568 S.E.2d 
at 475. 
49. Id. 
50. See GA. HB 91 (2003). 
51. See GA. HB 792 (2003); GEORGIA 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SIGNED 
BY THE GOVERNOR LIST, avail-
able at 
http:/ /www.legis.state.ga.us/legis 
/2003_04/leg/ govsign.html (last 
visited June 23, 2003). 
52. See GA. HB 792 (2003). 
53. Most courts admit that manifest 
disregard is a limited ground for 
vacatur. Some, however, have 
adopted a very broad interpreta-
tion. 
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